The Impact of Bolsa Familia on Child, Maternal, and Household Welfare

Latin America

Brazil

Social Protection

Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT)

de Brauw, A., D. O. Gilligan, J. Hoddinott, and S. Roy.

2010

de Brauw, A., D. O. Gilligan, J. Hoddinott, and S. Roy. (2010). “The Impact of Bolsa Familia on Child, Maternal, and Household Welfare.” IFPRI Report.
View publication

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2010

Bolsa Familia

2003 - Present

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To be eligible for Bolsa Família payments, households must be listed in a registry called the Cadastro Único. This registry contains information on household demographic characteristics, household income, and prior participation in transfer programs. All households are free to register in the Cadastro. However, municipality-level officials are responsible for organizing the registration process, such that there is substantial heterogeneity across municipalities in targeting for Cadastro registration, as well as in registration methods. Moreover, conditional on registration in the Cadastro, the criteria for selection into Bolsa Família also differ by municipality. Beneficiaries are selected at the national level, through the following procedure. Each municipality is assigned a quota for maximum number of Bolsa Família recipient households based roughly on poverty maps. If the number of households in a particular municipality with income per capita below the threshold is lower than the municipality’s quota, then all such households are selected for Bolsa Família. 6 If the number of households in a particular municipality with income per capita below the threshold exceeds the municipality’s quota, then priority is assigned for selecting households into Bolsa Família roughly according to the following criteria 7: (1) lower household income per capita, and (2) the number of children aged 0 to 17 in the household. As a consequence, while eligibility criteria are similar across municipalities, two households below the income per capita threshold with very similar characteristics may have different recipient status due to being in municipalities with different quotas and due to the element of randomness in prioritization within municipalities.

Payments associated with Bolsa Família consist of (1) an unconditional transfer to “extremely poor” households below a certain per capita income threshold; and (2) an additional conditional variable payment per child aged 0 to 15 years, for up to three children, to “poor” households below a higher per capita income threshold. The transfer is conditional on pregnant women receiving timely prenatal care visits, all children aged 0 to 5 within the household receiving timely vaccinations and growth monitoring visits, and all children aged 6 to 15 attending school.

• Education: The proportion of children aged 6-17 currently attending school, the proportion of children aged 6-17 in school last year that progressed to the next grade level, and the proportion of children aged 6-17 in school last year that are repeating grade level.
• Child Labour: Participation in paid or unpaid work outside the home for children aged 5-10, 11-15 and 16-17, age of entry into the labor force for children aged 5-17, participation in household chores for children aged 5-17, and for girls aged 5-17 weekly hours spent in household chores conditional on participating in household chores.

Propensity score matching

Data: In 2005, 15,426 households were interviewed as part of a baseline study on Bolsa Família referred to as AIBF-1 (“Avaliação de Impacto do Programa Bolsa Família”). The sampling design included some households that in 2005 were already participating in Bolsa Família (Stratum 1), some households that in 2005 were registered in Cadastro Único but not participating in Bolsa Família (Stratum 2), and some households that in 2005 were not in Cadastro Único and therefore were not participating in Bolsa Família (Stratum 3). In 2009, a follow-up survey (AIBF-2) of the same households, using an expanded but otherwise nearly identical survey instrument, was conducted. The follow-up survey was able to trace and re-interview 11,433 of the original households, implying an annual attrition rate of approximately 6.5 percent. In both 2005 and 2009, households were asked about their registration in the Cadastro Único as well as whether they received transfers.
Estimation strategy: The authors estimate an average treatment effect on the treated as follows. They create two different treatment groups. The first treatment group (“Treatment Definition 1”) includes all households that were listed in Cadastro Único in 2005 but did not receive Bolsa Família transfers in 2005, yet started receiving Bolsa Famlia transfers by the 2009 round. The second treatment group (“Treatment Definition 2”) includes all households receiving Bolsa Família transfers in 2009, including both those that did not yet receive Bolsa Família transfers in 2005 and also those that already received Bolsa Família transfers in 2005.

They compare these two treatment groups to a control group by means of propensity score weighted regressions. The control group is restricted to households who were listed in the Cadastro Único in 2005, who did not receive Bolsa Familia in 2005, and who were not receiving benefits from other social programs (e.g., Bolsa Escola) in 2005. The comparison of treatment definition 1 to the control group gives the cleanest comparison. However, the number of households that fall within this definition is relatively small. The number of households in treatment definition 2 is larger and thus gives more statistical power.

Depending on the specification used, Bolsa Família increases school attendance by 4.5 (Treatment definition 1) and 4.1 (Treatment definition 2) percentage points. The impact is larger for females and somewhat more precisely measured. Children aged 6-17 who reside in households receiving Bolsa Família are more likely to progress from one grade to the next. The impact on grade progression is concentrated among girls aged 15 and 17. There is suggestive evidence (Treatment definition 2, significant at the 10 percent level) that children, particularly girls, are less likely to repeat a grade. Levels of participation in paid or unpaid work outside the home are low and Bolsa Família has no statistically significant average impact on the proportion of children age 5-17 reporting doing any work outside the home. Bolsa Família did delay labor market entry by 0.8 (Treatment definition 1) years. The impact is larger for males than for females. Bolsa Família had no impact on the proportion of children aged 5-17 participating in any domestic work, on average, in 2009. However, conditional on performing any domestic work, Bolsa Família reduced the amount of time girls 5-17 spent undertaking domestic work by nearly three hours per week.

Child Labour

Households

National

Participation in paid or unpaid work outside the home are low and Bolsa Família has no impact on the proportion of children age 5-17 reporting doing any work outside the home. Bolsa Família did delay labour market entry by 0.8 years. The impact is larger for males than for females. Bolsa Família had no impact on the proportion of children aged 5-17 participating in any domestic work, on average. However, conditional on performing any domestic work, Bolsa Família reduced the amount of time girls 5-17 spent undertaking domestic work by nearly three hours per week.

Bolsa Família increases school attendance by 4.1 percentage points. The impact is larger for females and somewhat more precisely measured. Children aged 6-17 who reside in households receiving Bolsa Família are more likely to progress from one grade to the next. The impact on grade progression is concentrated among girls aged 15 and 17. There is suggestive evidence that children, particularly girls, are less likely to repeat a grade.

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