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Labour Market / Labour Regulation / InspectionDownload PDF

Perverse Consequences of Well Intentioned Regulation: Evidence from India’s Child labour Ban

Publication information

Region
South Asia
Country
India
Policy Area
Labour Market
Policy
Labour Regulation / Inspection
Authors
P Bharadwaj, LK Lakdawala, N. Li
Year
2013
Full citation
Bharadwaj, Prashant, Leah K Lakdawala, and Nicholas Li. “Perverse Consequences of Well-Intentioned Regulation: Evidence from India’s Child Labor Ban.” Journal of the European Economic Association 18.3 (2020): 1158–1195.
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Data
Secondary Data: National Sample Survey (NSS) of India. Available at: http://www.microdata.gov.in/nada43/index.php/home.
Ref. year
2020

Programme details

Programme name
Child Labor Prohibition and Regulation Act of 1986
Start / end date
1983-2008 (range of data)
Objectives
The objective of the law was to regulate provisions related to child labor practices in India. The purpose of the paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of these laws.
Eligibility criteria
The target population was children up to 14 years old – ineligibility to work in certain areas (see “Intervention”).
Intervention
The 1986 law attempted to bring uniformity in the minimum age restriction—people up to age 14 were defined as children and therefore ineligible to work in certain industries and occupations. Subsequent additions to the list of industries banned from hiring children under 14 were made at various points between 1989 and 2008. The occupations subject to the ban after 1986 and before 1994 (the period examined in the paper) were occupations that involved the transport of passengers, catering establishments at railway stations, ports, foundries, handling of toxic or inflammable substances, handloom or power loom industry and mines among many others.

Evaluation details

Outcome variables
  • Child labor (any economic activity, paid or unpaid)
  • School attendance
  • Household outcomes (income, expenditure, calories intake)
Methodology
Difference-in-differences
Design
Study design: simple differences-in-differences (pre and post-law), controlling for household and child-level covariates, such as characteristics of the household head and fixed effects for gender, state, and household size.
Sample: over 317,000 children between the ages of 6 and 13 who are related to the head of the household.
Survey Instrument: The employment schedule of the National Sample Survey (NSS) survey collects information on employment activities and wages in addition to household and individual level demographic data. The main measures of child time allocation examined in the paper are based on the child’s reported “principal usual activity” in the 365 days previous to the survey. These activities are reported as mutually exclusive categories. The authors define “Any Economic Activity” as any form of child work in any occupation, both within and outside the household, with or without pay, but excluding unpaid household chores performed for one’s own family (reported separately as “Unpaid Household Services”).

Evaluation results

Results summary
As a consequence of a ban on child labor in India (the Child Labor Prohibition and Regulation Act of 1986), the relative probability of child employment increased, and child wages (relative to adult wages) decreased.
Form of exploitation
Child Labour
Affected group
Households
Location
National
Result on Child labour
The relative probability of child employment increases and child wages (relative to adult wages) decrease after the ban. The increases in the probability of economic activity are largest for children (i) in areas where the industries targeted by the ban play a larger role in local labour markets, (ii) in areas where the probability of employer inspections is higher, and (iii) in families that are poorer.
Other results
-
Notes
The increases in the probability of economic activity are largest for children (i) in areas where the industries targeted by the ban play a larger role in local labor markets, (ii) in areas where the probability of employer inspections is higher, and (iii) in poorer families.